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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀect of market power on the equilibrium path
of an emission permits market in which ﬁrms can bank current permits for use in
later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (poten-
tially dominant) ﬁrm and a competitive fringe with rational expectations. Rather
than providing a full description of the equilibrium solution for all combinations of
permits allocations and cost structures, we provide a characterization of the equi-
librium solution for a few illustrative cases. For example, we ﬁnd that if the large
ﬁrm enjoys a dominant position in the after-banking market, it can always extend
this dominant position to the market during the banking period regardless of the
allocation of the stock (bank) of permits.
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(PUC). We thank participants at a workshop held in October of 2002 at Helsinki School of Economics
for comments and the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research for ﬁnancial support.
Montero also thanks PUC for a research grant (DIPUC No. 2002/19E).
11 Introduction
Emission permits trading usually refers to trades across space in the same period of time,
but it can also refer to trades through time, typically by banking, i.e., the possibility of
carrying over unused permits from one period for use in later periods.1 Over the past
decade, this latter dimension of emission permits trading has drawn increasing attention
in the literature and proposals to decrease emission caps over time suggest a particular
larger role for banking in the future.2 A salient example is the US Acid Rain Program,
where banking has been a major form of emissions trading (Ellerman et al, 2000; Ellerman
and Montero, 2002). During the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the program constituting Phase I, 1995-
99, only 26.4 million of the 38.1 million permits (or allowances) distributed were used
to cover emissions. The remaining 11.65 million allowances (30% of all the allowances
distributed) were banked to be used during Phase II.
Several authors have studied the theoretical properties of intertemporal trading (Ru-
bin, 1996; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Schennach, 2000), but there is little work looking
at the eﬀect of market power on the equilibrium path. Because the evolution of a permits
bank is closely related to the evolution of an exhaustible resource stock,3 in this paper
we draw upon both the literature on permits markets and the literature on exhaustible
resources to analyze whether and how a large (dominant) ﬁrm can aﬀect the market
equilibrium path. We consider the possibility of market power both during and after the
banking period. We ﬁnd that if the large ﬁrm is able to exercise market power in the
after-banking market, as described by Hahn (1985), then it is also able to manipulate the
market during the banking period regardless of the permits allocation during the banking
period.
1Borrowing of permits from future vintages could also be included (and may be eﬃcient to do so),
but it has attracted much less attention than banking.
2An eﬀective policy for reducing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations would likely include
emission caps that would become more stringent over time.
3There are important diﬀerences though. First, the permits market still remains after the permits
bank has been exhausted while the market for a typical exhaustible resource vanish after the total stock
has been consumed. Second, extraction costs for permits are zero while they are generally positive for a
typical exhautible resource. In addition, the demand for permits corresponds to a derived demand from
the same ﬁrms that hold the permits while the demand for a typical exhaustible resource comes from a
third party.
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
derive the equilibrium path (i.e., price and quantity paths) for a competitive market. In
Section 3, we study the evolution of prices and quantities for a market composed of large
ﬁrm and a competitive fringe with rational expectations. Final remarks are in Section 4.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider an industry with a large number N of heterogenous plants whose emissions are
regulated by a tradeable permits program with banking (a ﬁrm may own one or several
plants). The regulator allocates a total of A(t)=
PN
i=1 ai(t) allowances (or permits) in
period t,w h e r eai(t) is plant i’s allocation at t (we will use capital letters for industry or
group-level variables and small letters for plant-level variables). For (aggregate) banking
to actually happen permits allocations must decrease over time (at least at a rate higher
than the discount rate for some period of time). To follow the design of the US Acid Rain
Program, we assume that during the ﬁrst T0 periods of the program the total number of
permits allocated in each period is AH and that thereafter is AL,w i t hAH À AL.4
Plant i’s unrestricted or counterfactual emissions (i.e., emissions that would have been
observed in the absence of the permits program) are denoted by ui and its abatement
costs by ci(qi(t)),w h e r eqi(t) are emissions reduced at period t.T h u s ,p l a n ti’s emissions
at t are ei(t)=ui − qi(t).A n e ﬃcient market solves the following inﬁnite horizon











s.t. ˙ B(t)=A(t)+Q(t) − U (2)
B(0) = 0,−B(t) ≤ 0 (3)
where r is the risk-free discount rate, B(t) is the stock (i.e., bank) of allowances at time
t ( d o t sd e n o t et i m ed e r i v a t i v e s ) ,Q(t) is aggregate reduction and U>A L is aggregate
4Alternatively one can let (AH − AL)T0 be the initial “stock” allocation and AL the per-period
allocation.
3counterfactual emissions.
The solution of (1)—(3) can be decomposed as follows. First, there is a static eﬃciency
condition that must hold at all times (even after the bank of permits is exhausted):
c0
i(qi(t)) = c0
j(qj(t)) = P(t) for all i 6= j,w h e r eP(t) is the equilibrium price of permits
at t.T o ﬁnd the rest of the solution, we use the static eﬃciency condition to denote
the industry least-cost curve by C(Q(t)). This implies that C0(Q(t)=P(t). Hence, the
Hamiltonian for the problem (1)—(3) can be written as
H = C(Q(t))e
−rt + λ(A(t)+Q(t) − U) − φB(t)
where λ(t) and φ(t) the multiplier functions.










φ(t) ≥ 0, φ(t)B(t)=0 (6)
In addition, taking the derivative of (4) with respect to time yields
d(C0(Q(t))
dt
− rC(Q(t)) + φe
rt =0 (7)
When B(t) > 0, φ(t)=0and marginal costs C0(Q(t)), and hence price P(t),f o l l o wt h e
H o t e l l i n g ’ sr u l ea n dr i s ea tt h ed i s c o u n tr a t er (note that permits are “extracted” at zero
cost). Expression (7) is commonly known as the (no) arbitrage condition.
Whether and when ﬁrms will bank permits depends upon the allocation of permits,
the evolution of marginal cost functions and the discount rate. For example, a signiﬁcant
reduction of the permits allocation in the future, as in the SO2 program, will result in a
banking period of some length T>T 0 (to be determined shortly): ﬁrms bank permits
during some period of time and gradually use them thereafter until the bank expires at
5See Kamien and Schwartz (1991).
4T.A f t e rT, permits trading continues (to equate marginal costs across plants) but total
emissions remain constant at AL.
The full compliance condition establishes the total number of permits allocated during
the banking period [0,T] be equal to the accumulated emissions during such period,
that is (this condition is equivalent to the exhaustion condition found in the depletable
resources literature)




At T the terminal condition E(T)=A(T) must also hold, which is
Q(T)=U − AL (9)
Combining (7), (8) and (9) we can solve for T∗ (the superscript “*” denotes eﬃciency),
w h i c hi nt u r na l l o w su st oc o m p u t et h ee ﬃcient price and quantity paths; P∗(t) and
Q∗(t), respectively.
As o l u t i o nf o rT∗ can be obtained if we assume some functional form for C(Q).F o r
example, if we assume that C0(Q) is linear, as found by Ellerman and Montero (2002)
for the SO2 program, the abatement path during the banking period is
Q(t)=( U − AL)e
−r(T∗−t) (10)












Let us next discuss the eﬀect on the market equilibrium path when a large number of
plants are owned by a single ﬁrm.
53B a n k i n g w i t h m a r k e t p o w e r
Consider now a permits market with banking in which there is a large and (potentially)
dominant ﬁrm and a competitive fringe.6 In its attempt to manipulate the market (i.e.,
deviate from the eﬃcient or competitive outcome), the dominant ﬁr mb e h a v e sa saS t a c k -
elberg leader knowing that all ﬁrms in the fringe have perfect foresight. More speciﬁcally,
the dominant ﬁrm’s decision problem is to choose the price path along with its reduction
(or emission) path that maximizes the net present value of its proﬁts provided that each
ﬁrm in the competitive fringe will take such price path as given and that neither its bank
nor the fringe’s bank can go negative.
Although this problem has been already solved for a typical exhaustible resource
under diﬀerent set of assumptions (Salant, 1976; Gilbert 1978; Newbery, 1982), the
proposed solutions do not immediately apply to a permits bank for several reasons.
First, extraction costs for permits are zero. Second, costs of storage for permits are zero
so speculators (and ﬁrms in the fringe) will make sure that prices neither jump nor grow
at rate higher than r. This also gives the dominant ﬁrm the possibility to buy (or sell) a
stock of permits from the fringe and store them for future use at no cost other than the
opportunity cost of selling them earlier.
Third, in a permits market the dominant producer can still exercise market power
after its stock (i.e., bank) and that of the fringe have been exhausted. So, contrary to
what would occur in a typical exhaustible resource market, it may be possible that the
dominant ﬁrm can still use its strategic position of the end of the banking period to
exercise some market power during the banking period even if it does not receive any
permits from the stock (AH − AL)T0 but only an allocation ﬂow throughout. Fourth,
because the demand for permits does not come from a third party (e.g., consumers)
b u ti n t e r n a l l yf r o mt h ef r i n g ea n dt h ed o m i n a n tp r o d u c e r ,t h ed o m i n a n tﬁrm’s decision
problem is not only the choice of a permits sale/purchase path (or a price path supported
by a sales path) but also of an abatement (or demand) path.
To study the dominant ﬁrm’s problem, let f index the competitive fringe and m
6Based on the analysis of Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) for an oligopolistic market, considering two
or more large ﬁrms and a competitive fringe should not qualitatively alter the main result of this section.
6the dominant producer that attempts to manipulate the market. Abatement costs are
denoted by Cf(Qf(t)) and Cm(Qm(t)), respectively. Total permits allocations are also
as before; although it is useful to make an artiﬁcial distinction here between stock and
ﬂow allocations.7 The total ﬂow (or per period) allocation is AL beginning in t =0
and the total stock allocation is (AH − AL)T0. The fringe receives a fraction θAL of the
ﬂow allocation and µ(AH − AL)T0 of the stock allocation, so the dominant ﬁrm receives
(1 − θ)AL and (1 − µ)(AH − AL)T0, respectively.
Depending on the allocations (and cost structures), the dominant ﬁrm can, in princi-
ple, manipulate the market during and after the banking period. As explained by Hahn
(1985), the after-banking manipulation is only proﬁtable if the allocation θ and costs
are such that the dominant producer is either a net seller or buyer of permits after the
bank has exhausted. In other words, the dominant ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
manipulate the after-banking market if it receives a ﬂow allocation exactly equal to the
number of permits that it would have demanded in a competitive after-banking market.
Rather than attempt a complete characterization of equilibrium paths for any possible
permits allocation, we shall describe the equilibrium path for two illustrative cases. Let
us ﬁrst consider the case in which µ =0and θ is such that there is no after-banking
manipulation. The latter implies that the after-banking equilibrium price will be as in
the competitive solution, i.e., P∗(T∗).W h e n µ =0, the fringe does not build a bank
on its own but buys permits from the dominant producer from the very the ﬁrst period.
The dominant ﬁrm, on the other hand, ﬁnds it proﬁtable to build and manage a permits
7The stock is the cumulative number of permits allocated above the long-term goal of AL.









X(t)=Uf(t) − Qf(t) − Af(t) (14)
˙ Bm(t)=Am(t) − Um(t)+Qm(t) − X(t) [λm(t)]( 1 5 )
Bm(t) ≥ 0 [φm(t)]( 1 6 )
Bm(0) = 0 (17)
where X(t) is the number of permits sold by the dominant ﬁrm in period t,8 Bm(t) is
the dominant ﬁrm’s bank and λm and φm are the multiplier functions associated to the
diﬀerent constraints.
Since ﬁrms in the fringe are price takers, it is irrelevant whether the leader solves for
P(t) or Qf(t). Replacing (13) and (14) in the objective function to form the corresponding



















= − φm(t), φm ≥ 0, φmBm =0 (20)









Eq. (21) shows that if the strategy of the dominant ﬁrm is optimal, the discounted value
of marginal revenues, C0
f −C00
fX,9 minus marginal costs must be the same (equal to zero)
8If the dominant ﬁrm act as a monopsonist then X(t) < 0.
9Note that since C00
f(Qf(t)) = ∂P(Qf(t))/∂Qf(t), marginal revenues can be expressed as P(t) −
P0(X(t))X(t).
8in all periods in which the dominant ﬁrm sells (i.e., marginal revenues net of marginal
c o s t sm u s tr i s ea tt h er a t eo fi n t e r e s t )a n dt h a ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m em a r g i n a lr e v e n u e s
m u s tb ee q u a lt om a r g i n a lc o s t s .
The characterization of the price path P(t) during the banking period can be obtained
from (18). Taking the derivative with respect to time, letting ˙ λm =0 , and rearranging
yields






f ˙ Qf(t) (22)
Although we cannot provide a precise characterization of P(t) without a functional form
for Cf(·), we can provide a general characterization about how it evolves over time.
Because there are no storage costs, we know that arbitrage prevents prices from increasing
at anything higher than the discount rate r, i.e., ˙ P(t)/P(t) ≤ r.W ea l s ok n o wt h a ts i n c e
marginal cost C0
m(Qm(t)) must increase at the rate of interest (otherwise the dominant
ﬁrm could rearrange its reduction pattern and save on compliance costs), we must also
have that marginal revenues C0
f(Qf(t)) − C00
f(Qf(t))X(t) raise at the rate of interest.
Provided that C0
f(Qf(t)=P(t) and X(t)=Uf(t) − Qf(t) − Af(t), marginal revenues























is the fringe demand elasticity (deﬁned positive). Since   increases with price because
C0
f(0) = 0 and C0
f(Uf)= ¯ P<∞, (23) indicates that in equilibrium prices P(t) increase
at lower rate than MR(t).10 Consistent with Salant (1976) and Newbery (1981), when
the fringe has no stock, it is optimal for the dominant ﬁr mt ol e tp r i c e sr i s ea tr a t es t r i c t l y
lower than the discount rate, i.e., ˙ P(t)/P(t) <r .11
10Note that the monopoly and competitive solution would coincide if the fringe’s demand for permits
(which derives directly from the marginal cost curve) were isoelastic (see Stiglitz, 1976). Such demand
structure, however, is not possible here because both the number of permits demanded at P =0by
any fringe member is ﬁnite (equal to its unrestricted or counterfactual emissions) and the demand for
permits falls to zero above some ¯ P.
11Note that if marginal cost curves are linear, ˙ Qf(t)/Qf(t)= ˙ P(t)/P(t). Replacing this into (22)
leads to ˙ P(t)/P(t)=r/2.
9Both the competitive and monopoly price paths are depicted in Figure 1. The time at
which the dominant ﬁrm’s bank exhausts is denoted by Tm. Because of the exhaustion
condition (8) and ˙ P(t)/P(t) <r , the monopoly path must start above the competitive
price and must cross it from above before exhaustion. Figure 1 also shows, as in the
exhaustible resource literature, that the dominant ﬁrm extends the banking period com-
pared to what would have been observed under perfect competition. The shape of the
quantity path Q(t)=Qf(t)+Qm(t), which can be derived from the price path, eq. (21)
and the exhaustion condition, is similar to that of the price path.
Before we move onto the second case it is important to mention what happens if the
dominant ﬁrm is also able to exercise market power after the bank has been exhausted
(i.e., after T). If the dominant ﬁrm is a net seller in the after-banking market, the choke
price Pm ≡ P(Tm) will be higher than P∗(T∗) but the rate of price increase will still be
lower than the rate of interest. The “choke” price can be readily estimated by solving
(21) subject to (14) and Qm(Tm)=U(Tm) − AL − Qf(Tm). If, on the other hand, the
ﬁr mi san e tb u y e ri nt h ea f t e rm a r k e t ,Pm <P ∗(T∗) and ˙ P(t)/P(t) <r .
L e tu sn o wc o n s i d e rt h es e c o n dc a s ei nw h i c ht h ef r i n g eh o l d sa l lt h es t o c k ,i . e . ,µ =1 ,
and θ is such that the dominant producer is a seller of permits at the end of the banking
period.12 One can think of diﬀerent candidates for the Stackelberg-rational expectations
equilibrium. For example, the dominant ﬁrm could propose a price path growing at a
lower rate that would induce ﬁrms in the fringe to sell all their stock as early as the ﬁrst
period. In the absence of binding contracts, however, this solution is time inconsistent
because as soon as the fringe’s stock is exhausted the dominant ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to revise its initial price path proposal and rise prices accordingly. Firms in the fringe
will anticipate the price jump and, hence, hold on to their permits rather than sell them
in the ﬁrst place.
Since the dominant ﬁrm receives no stock, another candidate is one in which the
dominant ﬁrm builds no bank and the fringe’s bank expires at the choke price Pm.
Neither can this solution be an equilibrium because the dominant ﬁrm sells permits
12Same qualitaive results apply if the the dominant ﬁrm is a monopsonist at the end of the banking
period (the end or “choke” price will be lower than the competitive price).
10before the end of the banking period. Since the dominant ﬁrm has enough ﬂexibility
to support this price path through diﬀerent sales path (all yielding the same discounted
sum of proﬁt so ft h ef r i n g ea n dt h el e a d e r ) ,i tc a nc h o s et oa c c e l e r a t et h ee x h a u s t i o no f
the fringe’s bank by holding on to its permits and selling them only after the fringe bank
has been exhausted at Tf <T ∗ (the time of exhaustion of the fringe’s bank is denoted by
Tf). But at Tf, the dominant ﬁr mw o u l dh o l dab a n ka n dw o u l dﬁnd its original proposal
no longer optimal and would let prices grow (after a possible instantaneous jump) at a
rate strictly lower than r until they reach Pm at Tm >T ∗ >T f. Consequently, the
equilibrium path must necessarily have the dominant ﬁrm conserving enough permits to
keep a stock that it will consume and sell after all ﬁrms in the fringe have exhausted
theirs, regardless whether it received some of the stock (AH − AL)T0 or not.
Without providing the complete market equilibrium solution, the latter equilibrium
condition gives us information to qualitatively describe equilibrium price and quantity
paths, P(t) and Q(t), respectively. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, there will be three
distinctive phases. During phase A, price P(t) rises at the interest rate r and quantities
Qf(t) and Qm(t) rise accordingly. While the fringe consumes its stock and the dominant
ﬁrms builds its own, it is not obvious whether the dominant ﬁrm participates in the
market during this phase (more on this below). At Tf t h ef r i n g e ’ sb a n ki se x h a u s t e d
but the dominant ﬁrm’s bank is positive. In phase B, P(t) rises at a rate strictly lower
than r and Q(t)=Qf(t)+Qm(t) also grows at a rate strictly lower than under the
competitive case since Qf(t) follows the price path. Furthermore, from the full compliance
(or exhaustion) condition, the observed path Q(t) crosses the competitive path Q∗(t)
sometime during this phase. At Tm, the leader’s bank is exhausted; after which prices
remain constant at Pm >P ∗.
W h i l ew eh a v ef o u n dt h a tt h ee x e r c i s eo fm a r k e tp o w e ri nt h ea f t e r - b a n k i n gm a r k e t
allows the dominant ﬁrm to extend its dominant position to the banking period regardless
of the allocation of the permits stock, we have not made precise how the equilibrium path
changes with permit allocations (θ and µ) and cost structures and how it deviates from
Q∗(t). For that, we need to derive the complete equilibrium solution. In particular, we
need to determine Tf and Tm, or alternatively P(0).
11The solution must not only be time consistent and exhibit the market power of the
dominant ﬁrm after the fringe’s bank has expired, but one can argue that it should also
make some use of the ability of the dominant ﬁrm to alter the stock of the fringe during
the competitive phase, i.e., phase A, by either selling or buying permits. But in the
absence of binding contracts, the latter possibility will be time inconsistent in the sense
that the dominant ﬁrm would continuously like to revise its original price path after
each transaction.13 To overcome these objections and still allow the dominant ﬁrm to be
more active during the competitive phase, Newbery (1981) argues that the Nash-Cournot
equilibrium appears to be the best approximation to the rational expectations Stackelberg
equilibrium.14 In our context, however, such approximation looks less attractive to the
leader, since in a permits market where there is no third party demand, the Nash-Cournot




Although we cannot provide at this point what we believe to be the most reasonable
equilibrium solution,15 a better candidate than the above is for the dominant ﬁrm to
refrain itself from any permits transaction during the competitive phase and only start
selling permits at Tf. This tentative solution can be found by ﬁrst imposing a continuous
price path that ends at Pm; the monopoly price that prevails when there is no bank left
and which can be easily obtained from (21). From 0 to Tf (the time at which the
fringe’s bank is exhausted) ˙ P(t)/P(t)=r,a n df r o mTf to Tm (the time at which the
dominant ﬁrm’s bank is exhausted) ˙ P(t)/P(t) <raccording to (22). At Tm and after,
P(t)=Pm >P ∗(Tm).
The rest of the solution (i.e., Tm and Tf) is found by simultaneously solving the two
“exhaustion” conditions: the fringe’s bank expires at Tf and the dominant ﬁrm’s bank
expires at Tm >T f. Since the dominant ﬁrm does not trade between 0 and Tf,t h e s e
13Since the dominant ﬁrm’s optimal sale or purchase is a function of the fringe’ stock, the ex-ante (i.e.,
before the transaction) optimal solution diﬀers from the ex-post optimal solution. The rational expec-
tations Stackelberg equilibrium derived by Gilbert (1978) in his example does not have this dynamically
inconsistency problem because he uses a constant demand elasticity (besides equal discount rates and
zero extraction costs), which is not our case.
14The Nash-Cournot equilibrium is also used by Salant (1976).
15See Liski and Montero (2003) for a discussion of all the diﬀerent issues that must be addressed in
ﬁnding such a solution.
12two conditions can be written as
Z Tf
0
Qf(t)dt =( Uf − θAL)T
f − µ(AH − AL)T0 (25)
Z Tm
0
(Qf(t)+Qm(t))dt =( U − AL)T
m − (AH − AL)T0 (26)
where Uf = U − Um.
The fringe’s abatement path Qf(t) follows the price path according to C0
f(Qf(t)) =
P(t). The dominant ﬁrm’s abatement path Qm(t), on the other hand, must minimize
the present value of the dominant ﬁrm’s compliance costs during the banking period,
hence, C0
m(Qm(t)) must grow at r until it reaches its long-term level at Tm (this value
can also be obtained from (21)). Replacing these abatement paths and the price path on
the above two conditions, Tf and Tm are ﬁnally found.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
We have investigated the eﬀect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission
permits market in which ﬁrms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In
particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) ﬁrm and
a competitive fringe with rational expectations. Although we do not provide a full de-
scription of the equilibrium solution for all combination of permits allocations and cost
structures, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium solution for a few illustrative
cases. For example, we ﬁnd that if the large ﬁrm enjoys a dominant position in the
after-banking market, it can always extend this dominant position to the market during
the banking period regardless of the allocation of the stock (bank) of permits.
Based on the preliminary results of our parallel work (Liski and Montero, 2003), it
should be mentioned that the full characterization of the market equilibrium for any
permits allocation is not a trivial exercise (e.g., when the large ﬁrm receives only a large
fraction of the stock of permits but does not enjoy a dominant position in the after-
banking market). It requires to address problems of time inconsistency and reputation
building. Time inconsistency arises because the dominant ﬁrm has incentives to alter
13its original path proposal as time passes. Since the fringe correctly anticipates this
possibility, the dominant ﬁrm may be unable to credibly sustain anything diﬀerent than
the competitive path (this is similar to the Coase conjecture problem). Under some
circumstances, however, one may argue that it could be possible for the dominant ﬁrm
to credibly sustain a more proﬁtable path as a subgame perfect equilibrium. To ﬁnd out
whether and when the latter can be the case, much more work remains to be done.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of market power on the abatement (quantity) path
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